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nets. But this mandates a separation of per-
son and world, scientist and fact, such that
one assumes that fish exist a priori and
independent of the scientist’s investigation.
Organisms, however, shape their worlds as
their worlds reciprocally shape them (Le-
wontin, 2000). Thus, the scientist who clears
land on his or her property for a new tennis
court will create the circumstances of a world
lacking fish as facts for discovery.
Cacioppo et al. (2004) should be cred-
ited for bringing attention to the different
consequences of the approaches of scien-
tific realism and instrumentalism. It is
ironic that they are inadvertently encourag-
ing psychologists, even as a practical lot, to
consider the entailments of metatheoretical
assumptions. Unification without regard to
these assumptions is like appealing for the
unification of Christianity, Judaism, Islam,
Buddhism, and atheism. However, it is a
disservice to the field of psychology to
pretend that realism and instrumentalism
constitute an exhaustive dichotomy, espe-
cially one whose resolution entails progress
toward scientific truths. If there is to be an
iterative deployment of differing epistemo-
logical and methodological practices, then
one should begin to recognize the signifi-
cant differences between a psychology in-
formed by scientism and one informed
by humanism/phenomenology, specifically
with regard to the place of the human being
as both scientist and subject. Public policy
and scientific practice cannot devalue or
ignore the concept of human being. Al-
though the appeal to scientific realism may
support one’s anxieties and desires to legit-
imize the discipline of psychology, it im-
poses an acceptance of the reducibility and
measurement of human beings, when hu-
man being is a concept that cannot be mea-
sured. Reality consists of the co-presence
of organisms and the objects to which they
tend, each term mutually exclusive, and
realism is the study of the emergent under-
standing of this dialectic.
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We wrote “Realism, Instrumentalism, and
Scientific Symbiosis: Psychological The-
ory as a Search for Truth and the Discovery
of Solutions” (Cacioppo, Semin, & Bern-
ston, May–June 2004) from the viewpoint
of practitioners of science who believe that
the perspective of scientific realism, which
many contemporary psychologists have
simply inherited, may now place unneces-
sary constraints on theoretical develop-
ments in psychology. In this belief, we are
clearly at odds with Haig (2005, this issue),
who argued that “realism alone can serve
as a sufficient philosophy for psychology”
(p. 344). Haig faulted our characterization
of realism as being noncomprehensive. Of
course, our intention was not to provide a
comprehensive review of the variations on
scientific realism but to describe some of
its core features and to consider their im-
plications for how psychologists think
about, formulate, and evaluate psychologi-
cal theory. Haig argued for one particular
version of realism (evolutionary naturalis-
tic realism, or ENR), but he acknowledged
that the core features we described apply to
ENR as well.
We recognize that reasonable people
can disagree on which philosophical per-
spective they prefer. We further believe
that theory and research in psychology
would benefit from the explicit consider-
ation of this question rather than, as is
currently the mode, accepting realism with-
out considering alternatives.
Haig (2005) criticized our proposed
symbiosis because the suggested perspec-
tive “will confuse psychologists rather than
provide them with effective understanding
and guidance” (p. 345). Psychologists have
long addressed complex problems with in-
telligence, sophistication, and clarity. We
therefore respectfully disagree that our per-
spective would simply confuse psycholo-
gists who chose to give it serious
consideration.
The divide between our proposals and
those of Lau (2005, this issue) and Ramey
and Chrysikou (2005, this issue) are less
dramatic. We anticipated that we would stir
some controversy. What we did not expect
is that some readers would conclude that
we were advocating scientific realism
(Ramey & Chrysikou, 2005) while others
would conclude that we were advocating
scientific instrumentalism (Lau, 2005). In
point of fact, we did not exclusively em-
brace either.
We suggested that among the
strengths of scientific realism is its ten-
dency to foster theoretical rigor, verifiabil-
ity, parsimony, and debate, whereas among
the strengths of instrumentalism is its ten-
dency to promote theoretical innovation,
synthesis, generativeness, and scope. We
proposed that the benefits of both might be
achieved by the appropriate iterative appli-
cation of each when thinking about, formu-
lating, and evaluating psychological the-
ory. We termed this perspective scientific
symbiosis.
Symbiosis between organisms does
not imply an averaging that would be un-
faithful to the two organisms. Nor does
symbiosis imply the morphing of the
organisms—the emergence of a new
organism—or a relativistic position. Sym-
biosis refers to an interaction between two
different organisms to the advantage of
both, or to a mutually advantageous asso-
ciation or relationship. A symbiosis be-
tween two approaches does not require the
emergence of an approach that is funda-
mentally different from either. The criti-
cisms of Ramey and Chrysikou (2005) and
Lau (2005), therefore, would seem more
appropriate had we proposed a synthesis or
a unification of realism and instrumental-
ism rather than a symbiosis.
By analogy, scientists benefit from ap-
propriately applying both inductive and de-
ductive reasoning to the problem of scien-
tific inquiry. The appropriate and iterative
application of induction and deduction in
science might reasonably be described as
symbiotic because the accrual of knowl-
edge (the endpoint of inductive and deduc-
tive reasoning) benefits from their iterative
application in the scientific method. Simi-
larly, we proposed that psychologists might
bring both realist and instrumentalist per-
spectives to bear on theorizing in science to
achieve a scientific symbiosis within the
theoretical domain. Our intention in this
proposal was not to advocate scientific re-
alism or scientific instrumentalism over the
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other within the conceptual domain any
more than the scientific method advocates
inductive or deductive reasoning over the
other when mapping between the concep-
tual and empirical domains. Having said
this, we agree with Lau (2005) that our
proposal marks only a beginning and that
additional examinations of ontological and
epistemic assumptions may produce other
forms, perhaps even better forms, of scien-
tific symbiosis. To stimulate or contribute
to such a pursuit is all that one could hope
to achieve.
Finally, Ramey and Chrysikou (2005)
stated that “public policy and scientific
practice cannot devalue or ignore the con-
cept of human being. Although the appeal
to scientific realism may support one’s anx-
ieties and desires to legitimize the disci-
pline of psychology, it imposes an accep-
tance of the reducibility and measurement
of human beings, when human being is a
concept that cannot be measured” (p. 348).
We, as scientists, would neither deny nor
devalue the concept of human being. In-
deed, we seek to measure it, as that is a
prerequisite for empirical science. As with
all scientific concepts, one measures opera-
tionalizations of concepts, and as with all
complex scientific concepts, the measure-
ment of multiple operationalizations may
be required. Measurement, perhaps, is not
necessary for all human understanding, but
for an empirical science it is. If, as Ramey
and Chrysikou asserted, the concept of hu-
man being cannot be operationalized and
measured, then it is not within the domain
of empirical science, and it is not subject to
scientific theory. However, many dimen-
sions of human existence and human be-
havior can be measured, and to these ex-
tents, the concept of human being is itself
subject to scientific investigation.
We agree with Ramey and Chrysik-
ou’s (2005) assertion that subjectivism may
color a scientist’s understanding of phe-
nomena under investigation. The division
of knowledge into disciplines reflects the
limits of human capacities, and the specific
aspects on which scientists choose to focus
are an expression of expectations and val-
ues. However, among the measurable qual-
ities in psychological science are the be-
liefs and values that scientists bring to bear
in their inquiries. The effects of such be-
liefs and values on their theory and behav-
ior can themselves be subject to scientific
scrutiny.
In sum, we appreciate the thoughtful
commentaries and hope readers agree that
they raise important questions and point to
worthwhile literatures beyond what we
could cover. We also hope that these com-
mentaries underscore the importance, espe-
cially for students who hold the future of
psychology in their hands, to take time to
consider the effects of the philosophical
perspective they inevitably bring to their
scientific inquiries and perhaps even to re-
visit this choice periodically to ensure that
the theoretical return on their scientific in-
vestment is optimized.
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We deeply appreciate the documentation
and inspiration provided by Zimbardo
(July–August 2004) on how psychology is
reaching out to the public by “giving psy-
chology away” (p. 340). We totally agree
that psychology has much, much more to
offer that could be used to improve human
lives.
We believe that in addition to a sin-
cere desire to give psychology away, there
needs to be a recognition of the realities of
living in a capitalist society. In a market-
driven economy, it is the value of intellec-
tual property in the form of revenue gen-
erated that will determine whether
psychological knowledge is widely dissem-
inated and used. Zimbardo (2004) made a
very good case for using the media to ob-
tain free advertising; however, we believe a
more radical approach is needed.
Giving psychology away has only oc-
casionally worked. Giving anything away
in a market-driven society is difficult, be-
cause it costs a significant amount of
money to inform people about a product
and to convince them that the offering is of
value. Giving a product away does not re-
move the need for advertising or some kind
of teaching or training because a person
must still understand how a product is per-
sonally valuable and must learn how to use
it. Giving psychology away generates no
revenue to cover advertising or teaching
costs.
An example from psychology illus-
trates the point that a fine product freely
available loses out to a product that is sold
and so has the funds to advertise. Altus
(1948) developed a brief intelligence scale
using sample sizes in the thousands. The
resulting Information Inventory takes only
a couple of minutes to give and score and is
easily memorized. Follow-up research has
confirmed its quality (Gorsuch & Spiel-
berger, 1965; Moon & Gorsuch, 1988). Yet
the instrument is practically unknown and
seldom used.
In our teaching in a graduate clinical
psychology program, we have given away
the Information Inventory to students for
their use. Instead, they generally use the
Quick Test (Ammons & Ammons, 1962)
despite that the Information Inventory is
faster, correlates better with the full-scale
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, and has
better norms than the Quick Test (Moon &
Gorsuch, 1988).
We can see one major reason why the
Quick Test is used more than the Informa-
tion Inventory. Each year the company pro-
motes the Quick Test with a mailing to
most psychologists. They can afford that
advertising because the Quick Test is pro-
tected by copyright and sold. The company
is promoting the test very effectively.
Several publishers have been ap-
proached about selling the Information In-
ventory. After initial high interest, they
drop the conversation. They note that after
selling a manual too short to generate much
revenue, the user would never need to buy
anything more. Therefore there is too little
revenue to support advertising.
Perhaps the lack of a way to generate
revenue and thereby advertising is a reason
why well-replicated and useful established
psychological principles—such as the cur-
vilinear relationship between motivation
and performance as a function of task com-
plexity (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908 [also
found to underlie, e.g., the social facilita-
tion effect])—are so little known. Unless
there is a way to cover the costs of taking
psychology to the people who can use it,
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